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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATRONE WARD SEARS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DWAIN THOMAS SOUTHWORTH, 
Defendant and Third- Case No. 14669 
Party Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, 
Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a third-party action to recover for personal 
injuries by Dwain Thomas Southworth (hereinafter called 
Southworth) against The State of Utah Department of 
Highways (hereinafter called State) arising out of an 
automobile accident. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the State dismissing the Third-Party Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT It 
THE MAINTENANCE OF A HIGHWAY IS A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT ARE APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS 
ARISING OUT OF SUCH MAINTENANCE. 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit for any injury which may result from the 
activities of said entities wherein said entity 
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function. 
If this action arises out of the exercise or discharge 
of a governmental function, Appellant must comply with the 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
in order to maintain his action against the State• 
Appellant, in his Third-Party Complaint, alleges that at 
the time of the accident, the State of Utah Department of 
Highways was "engaged in road repairs or maintenance" and 
in so doing breached a legal duty to Appellant causing 
his injuries. (R. 120-123) 
This Court has consistently held that the repair and 
maintenance of roads and highways is a governmental function. 
In Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 
800, 802 (1941), this Court stated: 
This Court is committed to the doctrine that 
the duty to repair or construct streets within 
its corporate limits is a governmental one and 
that in the absence of a statute no liability 
devolves on a municipality for the defective 
condition of its streets. 
The later case of Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 
366 P.2d 986 (1961) characterizes "repairing streets" as 
a governmental function and further outlines the test 
for classifying governmental or public (proprietary) 
functions as follows: 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The most general test of governmental function 
relates to the nature of the activity. It must 
be something done or furnished for the general 
public good, that is, of a 'public or governmental 
character1, such as the maintenance and operation 
of public schools, hospitals, public charities, 
public parks or recreational facilities. In addition 
to the above mentioned general test the supplemental 
ones are also applied: (a) whether there is 
special pecuniary benefit or profit to the city and 
(b) whether the activity is of such a nature as 
to be in real competition with free enterprise. 
12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 at 988. 
The construction and maintenance of a highway is 
certainly for the public good. It neither inures to the 
special pecuniary benefit or profit of the State nor places 
the State in competition with free enterprise. The Utah 
position is clearly that the construction and maintenance 
of a highway is a governmental function. To classify it 
as proprietary would be to deny the long standing judicial 
pronouncements of this Court and is not supported by facts 
or sound reasoning. 
This case arose out of the exercise of a governmental 
function and the Appellant is required to comply with the 
notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
as a condition to bringing his action. (Section 63-30-12, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended) This he has failed to do and has 
so admitted in the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief. 
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POINT II: 
APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF HIS CLAIM TO THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND HIS CLAIM FOR RELIEF IS THEREBY BARRED BY 
SECTION 63-30-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED. 
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
A claim against the state or any agency thereof 
as defined herein shall be forever barred unless 
'.-..'•..,, notice thereof is filed with the attorney general 
of the state of Utah and the agency concerned 
within one year after the cause of action arises, 
(emphasis added) 
The cause of action for Appellantfs claimed injuries 
and loss arose on the date of the accident, May 10, 1973. 
His notice of claim was filed nearly two years later on 
April 5, 1975. 
This Court has consistently held that actions will be 
barred if a notice of claim is not filed strictly within 
the time limit prescribed by the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
*n Varoz v. Sevy, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), 
an automobile failed to negotiate a turn and the occupants 
were killed. A suit was brought against Salt Lake County, 
alleging that the warning signs and the guard rail on the 
5 
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curve were inadequate. The plaintiff failed to file his 
notice of claim with Salt Lake County until after the ninety 
(90) day notice period had run as provided in a companion 
statute, Section 63-30-13. The plaintiff contended that 
since the county had actual knowledge of the circumstances 
surrounding the accident, notice of claim was unnecessary. 
In affirming the trial court's dismissal, this Court said: 
From the language of the statute it is quite 
clear that the legislature intended to make 
the filing of a timely notice of claim prerequisite 
to maintaining an action... 
Actual knowledge of the circumstances which 
resulted in the death of the plaintiff's mother 
by officials of the county does not dispense 
with the necessity of filing a timely claim. 
29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 at 436. 
Appellant contends that even though a formal notice 
of claim was not filed within the one year period, a written 
investigating officer's repox-t of the traffic accident was 
filed with an agency of the state government within one 
year of the accident. He contends that the notice of claim 
requirement under the Governmental Immunity Act was satisfied 
by the filing of the accident report. 
6 
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In Scarborough v» Granite School District/ Utah 2d, 
, 531 P.2d 480 (1975), the plaintiff failed to timely 
file a formal notice of claim. In an opinion affirming a 
dismissal of the action, this Court set forth the essential 
requirements of a notice of claim as follows: 
We have consistently held that where a cause 
of action is based upon a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent to 
the right to maintain a suit. In order to so meet 
the requirements of the statute quoted above and 
fulfill its intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim 
should include these essentials: that it be in 
writing; that it contain a brief statement of the 
facts and the nature of the claim asserted; that 
it be subscribed by the party required to give it 
and who intends to rely on it; that it be directed 
to and delivered to some one authorized to or 
responsible for receiving it; and that this be 
done within the prescribed time. 
531 P.2d 480 at 482. 
The investigating officer's report routinely filed 
with intra-governmental agencies does not satisfy the 
statutory notice requirements. Most importantly, it is 
not a notice of claim and is not in a form calculated to 
give notice.of plaintiff's intention, if any, to claim 
against the entity. To be effective the claim must contain 
the essential elements noted above and be filed and served 
upon the governmental agencies mentioned in the statute 
by or on behalf of the claimant. 
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As the California Supreme Court said in Fidelity and 
Deposit Company v. Claude Fisher Company, 161 Cal. App. 2d, 
431, 327 P.2d 78, 81 (1958) : 
Statutes of limitations and the like, prescribing 
definite periods of time within which actions may 
be brought or certain steps taken are, of necessity, 
adamant rather than flexible in nature. Such 
statutes are upheld and enforced regardless of 
personal hardship, and they are favored by the 
courts. 
Cited with approval in Roosendall Construction and xMining 
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d, 396, 503 P.2d 446 at 448 (1972). 
In the latter case this Court held a complaint "fatally 
defective" because compliance with the statutory notice 
requirements was not alleged. 
Appellant contends that the one year period within 
which notice is to be given does not begin to run until 
discovery of negligence on the part of the State. 
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, expressly provides 
that a claim must be filed "within one year after the 
cause of action arises." Appellant's cause of action 
arose on May 10, 1973, at the instant the accident occurred, 
and the one year period began to run at that time. 
8 
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In Varoz v. Sevy, supra, plaintiff mistakenly filed 
a notice of claim with the State of Utah when Salt Lake 
County was the entity responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of the roadway where the accident occurred. 
When the plaintiff finally discovered that his claim should 
have been against Salt Lake County, the time for filing 
notice had expired. Even so, this Supreme Court upheld a 
dismissal of the action for failure to file proper notice. 
The time period in Varoz ran from the date of the injury 
and not from the date of discovery of the claimed wrongdoing 
by the governmental entity. The one year period within which 
Appellant in this action was to have filed his notice of 
claim began to run on May 10, 1973, the date of the accident. 
POINT III: 
THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
ARE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTIES OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES. 
The recent case of Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 
Utah 2d _, 552 P.2d 646 (1976), is dispositive of this 
issue. This Supreme Court was presented with the question 
of whether different time periods within which notices of 
claim must be filed with city, county and state governments 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were violative of equal protection guaranties. In upholding 
the constitutionality of such notice provisions, this Court 
said: 
While no precise formula has been enunciated, 
it is generally held that the legislature has 
a wide discretion in enacting laws which affect 
one group of citizens differently than other 
groups. The constitutional safeguard of equal 
protection is offended only if the classification 
rests upon a ground not relative to the State's 
objective. The legislature is presumed to have 
acted within their constitutional authority 
even though inequality results. 
552 P.2d 646 at 647. 
This Court has passed upon the question of the 
rationale of notice provisions and has found them to be 
relative to the state's legislative objectives. As such 
they do not offend equal protection guaranties of the 
federal or state constitutions. 
In the earlier case of Gallegos v. Midvale, 27 Utah 
2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), this Court also considered 
the question of whether notice provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act violated equal protection guaranties 
of a minor claimant. There, as in the case at bar, the 
claimant had failed to file a timely notice of claim. 
10 
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This Supreme Court held that the notice provisions of the 
Act did not deprive the claimant of equal protection rights 
and affirmed a dismissal of the suit. 
These decisions of this Supreme Court are well reasoned 
and well founded in law. Both this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court have consistently held that legislation 
may discriminate between classes of individuals if the 
classification is reasonable and has some rational relation 
to a legitimate legislative objective, e.g., San Antonio 
Independent School v. Rodriguez/ 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); 
State v. Warwick, 11 Utah 2d 116, 355 P.2d 703 (1960); 
Wein v. Crockett, 115 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222 (1948). 
In recent years the courts have applied a two-tiered 
approach to analysis of equal protection claims. If the 
classification is based on a "suspect criterion", or 
affects a "fundamental interest", the statute will be 
scrutinized closely and will not be upheld unless necessary 
for a "compelling state interest". Such areas of suspect 
criteria and fundamental rights are very limited. 
11 
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Suspect criteria include race, Loving v. Virginia, 
338 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); and national origin, Korematsu V. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
Fundamental rights include the right to vote, Kramer 
v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 
(1969), the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 629-31 (1969), the right to procreate, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the right to marry, 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
Conversely, if the classification is not "suspect" 
and the right affected is not "fundamental", all doubts 
will be resolved in favor of the legislation and it will 
be upheld unless the classification is wholly irrelevant 
to the purpose of the statute. As the United States 
Supreme Court held in McCowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425-26 (1961) : 
Although no precise formula has been developed, 
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
permits the States a wide scope of discretion 
in enacting laws which affect some groups of 
citizens differently than others. The constitutional 
safeguard is offended only if the classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the State's objective. State legislatures 
are presumed to have acted within their consti-
tutional power despite the fact that, in practice, 
their laws result in some inequality* A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state 
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. 
(emphasis added) 
The Court should, therefore, look to the purposes of 
the notice statute. If there exist purposes which would 
justify a notice requirement for claims against governmental 
entities, the statute should be upheld. 
There are numerous purposes for notice statutes. 
Among them are the following: 
1. A requirement of notice provides the 
governmental entity with the opportunity to 
settle meritorious claims before suit is 
instituted, thus avoiding needless litigation 
and legal expense. 
2. A requirement of notice provides the 
governmental entity with an opportunity to 
investigate claims while the evidence is still 
fresh and thereby to avoid stale and fraudulent 
claims. 
3. A requirement of notice allows the 
governmental entity to make prompt repairs of 
dangerous defects or adjustment of dangerous 
practices thereby avoiding other injuries and 
resultant suits. 
4. A requirement of notice facilitates 
budgeting and tax planning. 
5. Notice requirements generally facilitate 
the orderly and expeditious administration of 
public business. 
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Some of these purposes were discussed by this Court 
in Gallegos v. Midvale City/ supra/ where this Court pointed 
out the problems in not requiring notice: 
The unsatisfactory aspects of such a situation: 
Deprivation of the city of an opportunity to 
make a prompt investigation of the particular 
case, and if any defect is found to exist to 
remedy it; the possibility that changes may 
have occurred in the material circumstances; 
and the carry-over to subsequent city adminis-
trations of responsibility for accidents that 
may have previously occurred, are sufficiently 
obvious not to require further elaboration. 
Many of the purposes of the notice provisions are 
set forth in the dissent in Scarborough v. Granite School 
District/ supra/ as follows: 
The purposes of statutes requiring the presen-
tation of claims to political subdivisions, 
prior to filing a suit, is in furtherance of 
public policy to prevent unnecessary litigation. 
The purpose of notice provisions is to afford 
the political subdivision an opportunity to 
investigate the claim while the matter is of 
recent memory, witnesses are yet available, 
conditions have not materially changed and 
to determine if there is liability, and if 
there is, the extent of it. These salutary 
provisions do serve to prevent needless litigation. 
The Appellant cites cases from three state courts 
which have overturned notice statutes. The cases of these 
courts, share a common error. Each assumes that the purpose 
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of their respective legislative schemes is to put 
governments on an equal footing with private tort-feasors. 
For example in Hunter v. North Mason High School, 539 P.2d 
845, 850 (1975) the Washington Court said: 
The state's waiver of tort immunity is unbridled 
by procedural conditions pertaining to the consent 
to be sued. 
And in Turner v. Stagg, 510 P.2d 879, 882 (1973) 
the Nevada Court said: 
The stated object of NRS 41.031 is to waive the 
immunity of governmental units and agencies from 
liability for injuries caused by their negligent 
conduct, thus putting them on an equal footing 
with private tort-feasors. 
In Reich v. State Highway Dept., 194 N.W. 2d 700, 
7 02, the Michigan Court said: 
[C]ontrary to the legislature's intention to 
place victims of negligent conduct on an equal 
footing, the notice requirement...bars the 
actions of victims of governmental negligence 
after only 60 days. 
The error of this analysis is obvious. If the 
legislature had intended to place governmental tort-feasors 
and private tort-feasors on an exactly equal basis, it 
would not have adopted the notice requirement in the 
first place. 
15 
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The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered the 
question of whether notice statutes violated equal 
protection guaranties. The Court commented on the cases 
cited by Appellant herein as follows: 
We find the opinion in Reich to be highly 
conclusory without any consideration of the 
rationale for such notice statute, nor any 
real analysis of the equal protection problem. 
We are not persuaded by that authority. 
We find Turner v. Stagg, 510 P.2d 879 
(Nev. 1973) to be equally unpersuasive... 
We believe the opinions of the Michigan and 
Nevada courts are contrary to the weight 
of authority. Most states have consistently 
rejected similar consittutional attacks. 
Newlan v. State, 535 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Ida. 1975). 
Other cases upholding notice requirements are 
Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1942); and 
Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W. 2d 904 (Iowa 1973). 
The notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 
are reasonable and have a rational relation to legitimate 
legislative objectives. This Court has held that as such 
they are not violative of equal protection guaranties of 
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States 
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POINT IV: 
TO HOLD THAT NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT ARE VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTIES 
WOULD BE TO INVALIDATE THE ENTIRE ACT. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity predates the founding 
of the State of Utah, and the founding of the United States. 
See e.g., Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792). 
This doctrine is part of the common law and has been 
consistently followed by the Utah Supreme Court. Holt v. 
Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
(1973); Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 
(1968); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 
349 P.2d 157 (1960); Jopes v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 
297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959); State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 21, 
286 P.2d 785 (1955); Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 
241 P.2d 907 (1952); Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Utah 
582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Campbell Building Co. v. State 
Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937); State 
Road Commission v. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 
P.2d 502 (1937); Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 
626 (1913). 
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Although frequently called upon to do so, the Utah 
Supreme Court has declined to alter this doctrine because 
to do so was a legislative matter. As this Court held in 
Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907, 909 
(1952): 
This phase of our law is well established and 
of long standing. If it is to be changed, that 
must come through the sovereign power of this 
commonwealth, the people, speaking through the 
Legislature. 
In 1965 the legislature responded by enacting the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, 
et seg. (1967). 
The Act waived governmental immunity subject to certain 
conditions or restrictions. Among them are limitations in 
amount of recovery, §63-30-34; limitations to certain types 
of actions, §63-30-5 through 10; the requirements of filing 
an undertaking, §63-30-19; and the requirement of filing a 
notice of claim §63-30-11 through 15. 
Not only the notice provisions but also all of the 
other provisions set forth above place different restrictions 
on persons wronged by governmental tort-feasors as opposed 
to those wronged by private tort-feasors. It should be noted 
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that if the analysis of the Reich, Hunter and Turner cases 
cited by Appellant is adopted, then any discrimination 
between governmental and private tort-feasors is impermissible 
and the entire Utah Governmental Immunity Act would be invalid. 
This Court would have to overrule a long line of cases 
upholding governmental immunity. 
In Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 26 Utah 2d 78, 484 P.2d 
1200 (1971), this Court said: 
[P]laintiffs...seem to say that...we should 
judicially abolish the doctrine altogether as 
being archaic and doing so judicially to 
legislate our Governmental Immunity Act out 
of existence. This last contention we are not 
inclined to espouse, in spite of a claimed 
trend in that direction, noted by plaintiffs1 
adversions to scholarly papers written by 
eminent educators, and the judicial pronounce-
ments of some sister states, (emphasis added) 
Respondent submits that if this Court strikes down 
the notice provisions on constitutional grounds, it will 
have effectively legislated the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act out of existence by judicial decree. To do so is 
contrary to the numerous decisions of this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The maintenance of a highway is a governmental 
function and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is 
applicable to actions arising out of such maintenance. 
As a condition to bringing his suit, Appellant must 
have filed a timely notice of claim with the State. 
This he has failed to do and he may not now maintain 
an action against the State of Utah. Appellant is pleased 
to accept the right to sue under the Governmental Immunity 
Act, but seeks to excuse himself from complying with other 
provisions of the Act. 
The notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act are reasonable and have a rational relation to legitimate 
legislative objectives. As such they are not violative of 
equal protection guaranties of the Federal or State 
Constitutions. To so hold would be to invalidate the 
entire Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
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/ / * 
DATED this // day of November, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By. & 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
BY. Af 
Kim R. Wilson 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent 
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